Introduction
Th e global (or even systematic ?) crisis that visibly started in 2009 in the form of the fi nancial crisis in the USA, creates new challenges for all national and supranational governments. States need to react eff ectively to existing global and local problems, not only with short-term anti-crisis measures, but especially with long-term strategies, including a further revitalization of their public administration systems.
In mid-2010, it is already detectable (in Greece, but also many countries in our region) that the sustainability of the public fi nance will be one core target to be achieved. Two options are available -simple cost cutting (as the "bad" choice) or improving effi ciency and eff ectiveness of any governmental actions (we feel that this is the way forward).
Many diffi cult changes "lie ahead" in the situation when many authors still feel that public administration reforms in the CEE region represent "unfi nished or recently started stories" (even though many governments use a diff erent rhetoric !). Unfi nished (especially "performance") changes and the so-called "post-accession crisis" (slowing or even reverting needed changes almost everywhere in new EU member states), combined with new "crisis challenges", create a really diffi cult environment and risk for future progress.
However, compared to the phase aft er 1989, the chance to react properly is much higher. Th e more developed CEE states are now in a better position. Th e transformation from "socialism" to "capitalism" was a unique process without any previous experience from change of this kind, and mistakes were unavoidable (just their scale was partly manageable). Now, when we need to react to new challenges,
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Th is brief introductory part of our paper summarizes fi ndings from a recent NISPAcee project (Bouckaert et al. 2009 ) concerning the NPM contents of reforms. Even though the pre-accession period was very much connected to capacity-building, where both "classic" public-management-reform measures and "CEE-specifi c measures" -such as fi ne-tuning or legal-structural retrenchment of existing institutions, improving the bureaucratic workfl ow and control in administrative organizations -and measures to achieve the EU conformity of certain institutions or policies were realized, important diff erences are visible.
To describe the situation, we can use Coombes and Verheijen (1997) and Pollitt and Bouckaert's (2000) classifi cation of reforms -these two classifi cations have the same basis and can be simplifi ed as follows:
1. Radical public management type of reform 2. Mixed type of reform 3. Incremental reforms If we exclude Eastern European countries, where reforms are still in their early phase making any attempts to label them both diffi cult and preliminary, the situation in the rest of the countries seems to be as follows (Table 1) : Table 1 Classifi cation of reforms in Central Europe
Country
Reform type
Czech Republic
In the Czech Republic, incremental and legalistic reforms dominated during the entire evaluated period. There were few management reforms after 2000. The "Conception of public administration reform" from 1999 was planned for complex changes, but only administrative measures were really implemented. New liberal government elected in 2006 tried to propose NPM changes, but does not have real power to implement them.
Estonia
Estonian reforms seem to be the most radical and NPM-based. One of the main challenges in Estonia has been posed by the desire to jump straight into having modern management systems without previously establishing a solid basis -the classical hierarchically-structured public administration. The central aim in Estonian public administration has not been to build a solid ground for democracy but to improve the effi ciency of public institutions. Yet, as a consequence of the policies adopted by successive neo-liberal governments, the underlying theme behind government reform initiatives has been decreasing the role of the state. Such an anti-state attitude has contributed to the development of ideas based on the minimal state.
Hungary
Hungarian reforms can be characterized as adhering to the mixed model, starting from a dominantly incremental and legalistic reform approach at the beginning of nineties, slowly changing to the mixed type with a radical NPM switch in the post-2006 period. Current NPM changes focus on two central elements -downsizing (including a radical decrease in civil-service employment -on the territorial and local levels this was well in the two-digit range, in some cases possibly even achieving 30 to 50 percent) and radical reform of the human resource management system.
Latvia
Latvian reforms can also be characterized as the mixed model from its beginning to the current reform activities. Several NPM types of reform changes were implemented, especially in the later phases of reforming the public-administration system, but NPM never dominated reform strategies.
Lithuania
The country report suggests that Lithuania appears to reach a second category (mixed model) of states called "modernizers" according to the classifi cation by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) . In the pre-accession period, Lithuanian publicmanagement reform was characterized by ad-hoc and sectoral efforts. The fi rst two attempts for comprehensive reform, which were undertaken by the Ministry of Public Administration Reforms and Local Authorities in 1995 and 1997, were not successful. More intensive competition over NPM-type reforms started only in the post-accession period.
Poland
Poland is the typical representative of the prevailing legalistic approach to the reforms, and it can be allotted to the third (incremental changes) group of reforms countries. Poland is continuously reorganizing management systems in the public sector. New Public Management had a limited impact on the Polish administration by providing ideas and demands for recognition of the need to modernize the Polish administration and at the same time reducing its size.
Romania
The information from the country report suggests that Romania lies somewhere between groups two and three. Each government after the 1989 revolution has had reforming public administration on its agenda. Though the concept of public management has not always intertwined with the reform of public administration, some new managerial ideas, such as the use of contractualization, strategic management and planning, performance-measurement systems, reform networks, etc., were included in reform packages.
Slovakia
Regarding the whole investigated period, Slovakia represents the mixed ("modernizers") approach, but a deeper analysis may distinguish between three main phases. Before 2003, the reform was dominantly incremental and legalistic, with few NPM ideas realized. During the second legislation of liberal prime minister Dzurinda's government (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) , radical NPM changes were realized, such as massive decentralization and introducing performance-fi nancing schemes. New prime minister Fico's coalition, in power from 2006, returns to the ideas of a powerful state dominating in the system of delivery of public functions.
Th e table indicates that the "weight" of NPM was very diff erent in the reforms. Clearly Estonia is the country from the sample where NPM ideas have prevailed in various public-administration reform concepts and strategies originating in the second half of the 1990s. Massive privatizations have led to the selling-off of strategic enterprises, such as railways (in 2001 until their re-nationalization in 2007), or crucial services, such as emergency medical aid, without much public discourse or market-testing. Czechia seems to represent the other pole, still reluctant to measures of marketizing the public sector.
Did NPM "deliver": What do we know ?
In this part, we briefl y analyze the existing experience with NPM implementation in CEE regions. On the country level, we use the example of Estonia for a brief evaluation, then we discuss in detail impacts from the use of diff erent NPM-type mechanisms in selected CEE countries.
Estonian reforms were heavily based on NPM approaches. From two choices -legalistic reforms led by German PA experts in the country (Drechsler 2001) or radical NPM changes -, it selected the second option. Already aft er few years, the best PA experts in the country (Drechsler, Randma-Liiv, Kattel and others) started to provide important warnings in connection with non-critical implementation of NPM ideas. Today Estonia, which was the main proponent at the beginning, belongs to the "strong opposers" of NPM-based reforms. Not only the opinion of the academic society is clear now (Drechsler 2005 , Randma-Liiv 2008 , Drechsler and Kattel 2008 , but also the government recognized important failures. Such change is a clear expression of the fact that expectations connected with NPM reforms in the country were not fulfi lled. Slovak experience with decentralization reforms provides a similar picture. With respect to the existing experience, the lesson from / for the "macro-level" is self-evident:
Overestimating the role of NPM, implementing NPM as the reform ideology and main goal when reforming administrative systems in transitional countries, is an evident mistake.
We should also add, not on the basis of our research, but on the basis of conclusions drawn by most important PA "gurus" (Pollitt, Bouckaert, Lane, Peters and 
Selected experience with NPM approaches / mechanisms / tools
In this part, we try to provide some evidence about results from implementing NPM techniques in CEE, dominantly using the evidence from the Czech and Slovak Republics. Th e main focus will be contracting, outsourcing and performance evaluation and management, where we already collected a large amount of direct data; other areas provide similar lessons.
Contracting local public services
Contracting local public services is a very frequent delivery solution in CEE. Several experts deal with the issue (Péteri and Horvath 2001 and Zoltán 1996 Th e data in Table 2 are a clear example of the situation; the availability of more limits the risk of interpretation mistakes. Th e main results from contracting should be a stronger economy for the same quality or slightly higher costs for much better quality. Both dimensions have been checked for Slovak conditions. Th e data provided by Meričková (2006) , Sičáková-Beblavá and Beblavý (2007) and other authors indicate that there are no major differences in the quality of the delivered services; thus we can focus on economy. Table 3 indicates that there is no general trend on unit costs, when we compare internal and external forms of delivery. Data diff er between sources and municipalities and are not very reliable, either. Costs for internal delivery solutions are underestimated; normally they do not include depreciations, overheads and transaction costs. In such conditions, external delivery costs below, let us say, 125 % of internal delivery costs may still represent an economical decision. Two connected issues need to be mentioned -limited results may be caused by non-competitive selections of suppliers, and the diff erences between unit costs in municipalities of the same size are too high. Table 4 provides evidence for the fi rst problem (no answer usually means direct award). Th e problem of too large diff erences for similar conditions was very visible especially at the beginning of our research, but still remains (Pavel 2009b, Majlingova and Sagat, 2006) . In some cases, municipalities pay more than 100 % of the costs for a service in similar conditions. Th is situation also persists because regular performance benchmarking is not the rule in Slovakia, Czechia, but also most of other CEE countries.
Outsourcing of supportive services in public organizations
Outsourcing of supportive services is a less frequently investigated issue, but existing data show that it is also a relatively frequent solution in CEE. Table 5 provides older data for the Czech Republic (more recent research in Slovakia shows similar patterns, see Meričková 2006) . Th e outcomes of outsourcing began to be investigated only recently, and our own data for Slovakia provide a very "bad" picture. Because data obtained via questionnaires are not and cannot be reliable, we conducted direct research in two selected organizations (municipality and administrative body) in Slovakia in 2009. Th e results are depressive -of 10 investigated decisions all 10 were non-economical. Th e most apparent problems were connected with internal transport, internal catering and external IT maintenance.
Program (performance) budgeting and performance evaluation and fi nancing
Alongside Estonia, Slovakia is the country where performance tools were introduced on a large scale. In this part, we will describe Slovakian selected experience.
Program perfomance budgeting
Slovakia began with a full-accrual medium-term program and performance budgeting at the national level from 2005 (legal basis created in 2004), and beginning in 2010, this method will also be applied at the municipal level.
In theory (Ochrana 2003) , program performance budgeting is a crucial budgeting tool, because it helps linking inputs to outputs, outcomes and results, and, if properly implemented (or with some time delay), it can signifi cantly increase "value for money" from public expenditure. Th is approach was also recommended by the EU (Allen and Tomassi 2001) .
Th e reality in Slovakia is diff erent. Th e current situation clearly shows that if program performance budgeting is implemented by top-down orders and in a bureaucratic way, it cannot deliver results but just increases costs. As of today, program goals are formulated similarly to the rhetoric from the past; indicators and targets are formal or missing completely. We provide the Ministry of Health's selected subprogram (most of the others were similar) from the 2009 budget as an example of bad practice:
Program: Prevention and protection of health

Sub-program: Improving quality of life and health of population
Goal: Improving and securing the health status of inhabitants by the realization of projects focusing on better natural and working environment.
Planned resources: not defi ned
Indicator: yes
Performance fi nancing and its pervasive effects
In this part, we will also use the Slovak facts as an example, namely for performance fi nancing of universities. Another similar case is the Czech Republic -performance (public schools) and fee fi nancing (private schools) plus demographic trends are main factors of an interesting situation in which high schools may soon be ready to accept about 90 % of the population, which is simply too much.
Th e revenues of universities in Slovakia consist of two main sources -public grants / transfers (80-90 %) and the universities' own incomes. For the allocation of public grants, the Slovak Republic uses almost to 100 % a formula-based performance fi nancing system. Th e system is as follows:
Program: University education, science and social support to students
• subprogram University education Grant to fi nance accredited study programs
• subprogram University science and technique Grant to fi nance research and development
• subprogram Universities' development Grant to fi nance development needs
• subprogram Social support for students Grant to provide support to students
• subprogram Targeted transfers Source: http://www.minedu.sk/FaR/FINVS/fi nvs.htm As indicated, public transfers represent the main source of income for Slovak universities and developed as described by Table 6 . Th e expectation was that the allocation formula would motivate schools to focus on quality and not so much on the number of students. Th e reality was completely diff erent; all schools reacted by a signifi cant increase of newly accepted students (Table 7) , which might be a positive fact in itself, but because the total amount of allocated resources increases very slowly, marginally "faster" than infl ation, the outcome is tragic: the grant per student decreased signifi cantly during the last 5 years. Th e "performance trap" was established. With less unit resources, the quality was sacrifi ced (well documented by the national ranking agency ARRA). Th e government reacted ex-post and started to increase the weight of scientifi c results in the formula (from 5 % at the beginning to 40 % today). Th e explanation of purposes for signifi cant increase of newly accepted students is simple. Th e management of a university was allowed to maximize the level of the public grant by maximizing the number of accepted students. Th is also really happened. Th e only open question is: was this planning mistake by the government intentional or caused by the lack of experience ?
Selected experience with NPM approaches / mechanisms / tools: Conclusions
On the basis of the above analysis, supported by similar fi ndings of other experts in the same or diff erent areas, we may conclude the following:
Results 
Possible explanations
As already indicated, several analyses (e.g. Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000 and 2004 , Lane 2000 clearly indicate that NPM strategies are not just positive multidimensional tools and that NPM as the simple dominating ideology was not the best basis for public-sector reforms anywhere. Th is is the general lesson, almost fully accepted by academia today.
In the following text, we fi rst provide important statements and than discuss selected explanations why NPM was less successful in the CEE region compared to more developed states. (Drechsler 2005, 101) .
"NPM is particularly bad if pushed upon transition and development countries because if it can make any sense, then it is only in an environment of a well-functioning democratic administrative tradition"
"Th e greater the shortcomings in a country's established management practices, the less suitable are the [NPM] reforms" (Schick 1998, 124) .
"Once a so-called Weberian administrative system is institutionalized, then it may make sense to consider how best to move from that system towards a more 'modern' system of PA" (Peters 2001, 176) .
"Importing NPM techniques that needed to improve Weberian bureaucracies when these were not present, and simultaneously building classical checks and balances was a tough reality. Reforming in such a case sometimes was organizing dysfunctions" (Nakrosis and Nemec, unpublished).
What was missing, what was and is different in CEE ?
Th e use of NPM in transitional countries, to be successful -to deliver positive outcomes and impacts -has to refl ect specifi c "transitional" circumstances, which may limit the possible positive impacts of NPM for reforming public sectors and exaggerate its negative features. Th e following text provides examples of the main region-specifi c features that clearly limit the (already controversial) positive potential of NPM use.
Competitiveness and business strategies
Th e early phases of transformation from a command economy to the market system are clearly characterized by the fact that even potentially competitive markets in transitive countries were not well developed, dominated by monopolistic or oligopolistic structures and behaviors. Given this, it is rather optimistic to expect that competition may help to improve the performance of the public sector: one of the main arguments for NPM's competitive arrangements are cost-savings as a result of competition.
One example of an unsuccessful attempt to use competition to regulate public service are the failures of the fi rst stages of health reforms in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Both countries switched from a general taxation system to a pluralistic health-insurance system too early (1993). Many health-insurance companies were established, most of which collapsed soon, creating just extra transactions costs and no benefi ts for the system. When fi nancial markets do not function, pluralistic insurance cannot deliver (Nemec and Lawson 2005] .
Did the situation improve ? Can public bodies get enough competitive bids ? Is the private sector ready to compete and co-operate with government today ? We feel that the responses will not be solely positive. Certainly, the situation improved. However, the business environment in most CEE countries is still far from perfect. According to our opinion (and that of others), short-term profi t strategies prevail while fair long-term business strategies are still rare. One example from our research may support these statements.
Th e city of Michalovce in Slovakia organized seven large-scale procurements in 2009. Th e average weighted number of bids (for fi nancial amounts) per one invitation was 1.1. We cannot prove that this is just the result of the low level of competitiveness; intentionally discriminatory formulated tender conditions may deliver the same result, but at least it is a clear example that competition is not present. If the failure is caused by the city management, why does (fair !) business not complain ?
Democracy, citizen as watchdog for government's malfunctions
Th e expectations at the beginning of the transformation were optimistic, but today we know well that democratic institutions and norms were not fully developed in CEE during the period of transformation, which lasted twenty years. Th e structures exist, but the behavior is "semi-socialist". A lot of research on attitudes, disillusion and norms was realized in connection with the twenty years from the changes in 1989. Th eir results are not very positive for any NPM attempts (Tables 8 and 9 ). A lack of sense of individual responsibility, paternalism and fi scal illusion remain important features of citizens' behavior. For example in Slovakia, 67 % of respondents believe that their problems need to be solved by the state (Bunčak et al. 2009 ). In the Czech Republic, the issue of co-payments in health care significantly infl uenced regional elections in 2009; social democrats used their introduction as a main fi ghting tool against the governing party -people still feel that "there is a free lunch".
In these conditions, the rent-seeking behavior of politicians and bureaucrats is fully eff ective (from an economic point of view) as the simplest way to maximize individual benefi ts, at least from a short-term perspective.
On the other hand, we need to stress that rent-seeking strategies will be realized independently of the presence of NPM measures. Th e service may be outsourced to relatives or friends, but it can also be channeled internally (Beblavý and Sičáková-Beblavá 2006) . Our data about the costs of local public services clearly support this statement.
"Quality of the state of law"
Th e possible success of NPM is also connected with the "quality of the state of law". Th e state is switching from the role of the provider to a regulatory function: such a change is impossible (technically possible, but cannot deliver results) in conditions where the regulation and guidelines do not exist and where the law is not respected.
As of today, we can fi nd too much evidence that respecting the law is not the rule for governmental offi cials and not required by citizens. In CEE, a minister can publicly say: "I know that the Law was not respected by our action. However, the fi ne is just a transfer from one state pocket to another, we need not care. And we have fi re engines, which is most important" (simplifi ed statement of the Slovak Minister of Interior, commenting on the breach of the public procurement law in 2005), and nobody cares: party preferences remain unchanged.
Many diffi cult NPM instruments are introduced without having any explanations, recommendations and guidelines for users available. Some countries have public procurement offi ces, for example, but if we check their web pages for standard templates, guidelines and other navigation, too few might be found -very poor results aft er more than 15 years of passing the fi rst procurement laws. Navigation on the implementation of NPM techniques like outsourcing, contracting and benchmarking is almost invisible on the government's web pages. And even if some navigation does exist -as for the PPP projects that are very popular today -it also includes apparent mistakes (such as the ideas that PPP is the tool with which to react to the lack of public resources or that PPP starts only today).
Th e eff ective use of NPM tools should be based on data and evidence. Th ese are almost not available. For example, only recently countries started to switch to accrual accounting rules, but this is still not enough: full cost accounting might be found only in a very small sample of public organizations (universities, hospitals).
Th e eff ective use of NPM tools needs also to be supported by new control and audit approaches, focusing both on legality and results. However, the current systems of public sector control / auditing in use in most if not all CEE countries predominantly belong to the old-fashioned administrative procedural type of control. New laws on fi nancial control were passed by national parliaments under pressure from Brussels, but in reality, eff ective mechanisms to control / audit real effi ciency, economy and eff ectiveness and quality of public-sector institutions and processes are still not in place (Pavel 2009b) .
Territorial fragmentation
Several CEE countries "suff er" from extreme territorial administrative fragmentation (Table 10 ). "Classic" examples are Slovakia, which has only 5.5 million inhabitants, but almost 2,900 municipalities, 68 % of which with less than a thousand inhabitants, and the Czech Republic with almost 10 million inhabitants, but close to 6,000 municipalities, 80 % of which with under a thousand inhabitants (see also  Table 10 ).
According to Davey (2002, 35) , such municipalities struggle with large implementation defi cits: "Reform programs are challenged by the inability of such communities to provide administrative and fi nancial capacity, and the scale economics and catchment areas necessary for essential services". For this reason, we feel that territorial fragmentation, in the absence of eff ective inter-municipal co-operation, may also be an explanatory factor in accounting for the diff erences between Estonia and Czechia and Slovakia. 
Corruption
It is diffi cult to measure corruption. Probably the most frequently used Transparency International CPI indexes describe opinions about corruption and do not measure it directly. Many methodologies are sensitive to the level of awarenesswhen respondents become more aware about the problem, results worsen. In any case, the risk of corruption in CEE is relatively high. We provide one set of data as an example (Table 11) . Th e high risk of corruption is the source of an increased risk connected with implementation of most NPM-type arrangements. To see this issue complex, we need to be fair: as already indicated, if offi cials are corrupted, they will withdraw their rent with or without NPM arrangements. However, in the case of NPM tools, such rent might be "channeled" to two partners -bureaucrats and suppliers -, and thus its total amount might be higher.
Education and training
NPM needs public managers and not only public bureaucrats. Our recent fi ndings (Nemec, Spacek and Suwaj 2009 ) from the research in Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are very interesting from this point of view. We found that publicmanagement programs are rare in Poland and do not exist in the other two countries. In this stage, we were only able to check some selected administrative reasons for this situation. At least for the Czech and Slovak conditions, it is apparent that neither rules for civil service education and training nor accreditation rules provide motivation for establishing a public-management program.
CEE countries differ !
Th e previous text provided many examples of missing mechanisms and limited environments for the successful implementation of NPM. To provide a complex picture, we need to stress again that our picture was just a general simplifi cation, the concrete situations diff er. For any of the above-mentioned (and not mentioned) facts, some countries are better off , some are still underdeveloped.
Th e best way to check the situation is cross-country studies with a uniform and tested methodology. We tried to realize one such research (Table 12) as a reaction to the too large diff erences between Slovakia, Czechia and Estonia concerning the use of benchmarking (Nemec and Merickova 2010] . Why is Estonia better off ? It is diffi cult to prove, but we feel that less fragmentation and less corruption and more responsibility may be part of the explanation.
Conclusions: Where do (should) we go ?
Th e analytical part of our paper leads to clear conclusions. NPM as the reform ideology cannot help developing countries. Also NPM tools and mechanisms delivered very mixed results in the CEE region, more negative than positive: mainly not because of their character, but because of their wrong implementation or non-implementation (we still feel that, for example, benchmarking may really help). As indicated at the beginning, the current global crisis would motivate governments to a new phase of public-administration reforms, at least to revitalize the public-fi nance system, currently coping with large defi cits and fast increasing debts. If the IMF prognosis (Table 13 ) became reality, we may expect Greece not to be the only state close to bankruptcy. Simple cost-cutting (also via some NPM mechanisms, including the sale of the last state-owned resources) may be a short-term escape, but we need more long-term polices. What "reform model" should be proposed to CEE governments ? Returning to pure legalistic "Austro-Hungarian" traditions would not deliver enough within the conditions of limited respect to the law, typical of most transitional countries, attempts to improve the performance of public administration by extra laws, norm and regulations cannot work. Anther potential option may be available: more and more frequently we may hear about the "Neo-Weberian" state (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, in CEE especially Drechsler 2009 ). (Table 14) If we compare their description of the "Neo-Weberian" model with important EU documents, especially "European Governance: A White Paper" (2001) and "European Principles for Public Administration" (1998), we may conclude that their contents are almost similar. Th us, the most important norms for the "Neo-Weberian" state, but also the "Modern Governance" state, would be:
Pollitt and Bouckaert
• reliability, predictability, coherence;
• openness and transparency;
• accountability and responsibility;
• professionalism;
• participation;
• eff ectiveness.
What does this mean ? In a simplifi ed way: "Adieu NPM" should mean that managing by contracts, objectives, competition, etc. as the goal, is a forgotten story (not only for CEE, but generally).
But governing by predictable, reliable and coherent, open and transparent, accountable and responsible bureaucracy, using evidence-and consultation-based policy-making and simultaneously properly managing the effi ciency, economy and eff ectiveness of any government operation is the future target.
Is such a model realistic ? Generally and in CEE conditions ? We are afraid that any model cannot be fully implemented in reality. How far governments will be able to go depends on many factors -internal and external. Could the possible future public-fi nance crisis be such a moving factor ? Table 14 Th e Neo-Weberian State (summary)
NeoWeberian
Shift from an internal orientation towards bureaucratic rules to an external orientation towards meeting citizens' needs and wishes. The primary route to achieving this is not the employment of market mechanisms (although they may occasionally come in handy) but the creation of a professional culture of quality and service; In the management of resources within government, a modernization of the relevant laws to encourage a greater orientation towards the achievements of results rather than merely the correct following of procedure. This is expressed partly in a shift from ex ante to ex post controls, but not a complete abandonment of the former;
[but:] Reaffi rmation of administrative law -suitably modernized -in preserving the basic principles pertaining to the citizen-state relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state actions;
A professionalization of the public service, so that the "bureaucrat" becomes not simply an expert in the law relevant to his or her sphere of activity, but also a professional manager, oriented to meeting the needs of his or her citizens / users;
[but:] Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and terms and conditions. (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004, 99-100) 
